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I. ABSTRACT 
Copyright and charity law are generally considered distinct and 
unrelated bodies of law.  But they are actually quite similar and complement 
each other.1  Both copyright and charity law are intended to increase social 
welfare by solving market and government failures in public goods caused 
by free riding.2  Copyright solves market and government failures in works 
of authorship by providing an indirect subsidy to marginal authors, and 
charity law solves market and government failures in charitable goods by 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D.,
New York University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1995.  The author thanks Dean Jon Garon and the 2015 
Nova Law Review Symposium, New Media and Old Metaphors.  The author also thanks 
Johnny Schmidt for helpful observations on the relationship between copyright and charity. 
1. See infra Part IV.
2. See infra Part IV.A–B.
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providing an indirect subsidy to marginal donors.3  Copyright and charity 
law complement each other by solving market and government failures in 
works of authorship in different ways.4  Copyright solves market and 
government failures in works of authorship by reducing ex ante transaction 
costs, but it increases ex post transaction costs.5  Charity solves market and 
government failures in works of authorship by reducing both ex ante and ex 
post transaction costs.6  Accordingly, the efficient scope and duration of 
copyright should reflect ex ante transaction costs, because charity can more 
efficiently reduce ex post transaction costs. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson observed, “[t]he essence of 
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another.”7  In other words, metaphors express analogies.8  For better or 
worse, legal reasoning depends on analogies.9  Lawyers argue cases by 
comparing them to other cases, and judges decide cases by comparing them 
to previously decided cases.10  Both assume that similar cases should 
generally produce similar results and dissimilar cases should generally 
produce dissimilar results.11  If it was negligent for a defendant to perform a 
particular act in a particular circumstance, we assume that it is negligent to 
perform similar acts in similar circumstances, but do not assume that it is 
negligent to perform different acts in different circumstances.12 
Analogical reasoning consists in determining when similarities and 
differences are relevant, and when they are not.13  Scholars disagree about 
                                                
3. See infra Part IV.C. 
4. See infra Part V.C. 
5. See infra Part V.A. 
6. See infra Part V.B. 
7. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980) 
(emphasis omitted). 
8. Dedre Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, in THE ANALOGICAL 
MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199, 199 (Dedre Gentner et al., eds., 2001). 
9. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 741, 741 (1993) (“Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning.  It 
dominates the first year of law school; it is a characteristic part of brief-writing and opinion-
writing as well.”). 
10. Id. at 741, 745–48. 
11. Id. at 745–46. 
12. See id. 
13. Id. at 745. 
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the merits of analogical reasoning in law.14  Critics argue that it obscures the 
general theories that should determine the outcome of cases.15  But advocates 
argue that it can reveal the weaknesses of general theories by recognizing the 
contingent and circumstantial values that they ignore.16 
But what if analogical reasoning were used to compare general 
theories of law, rather than particular cases?17  Perhaps it could help identify 
relationships between theories that would otherwise be obscured, and thereby 
improve our understanding of those theories and how they apply in 
practice.18 
This Article argues that comparing the prevailing theories of 
copyright and charity law reveals that they are strikingly similar and 
complementary bodies of law.19  Copyright and charity law are both intended 
to increase social welfare by solving market failures in public goods caused 
by free riding.20  But they do so by reducing different kinds of transaction 
costs.21  It follows that each should be designed to focus on the transaction 
costs it is best suited to address.22 
III. WELFARE & COPYRIGHT 
In his provocative article Author’s Welfare:  Copyright as a 
Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, Tom Bell argues that welfare 
and copyright are similar because both are statutory entitlements intended to 
increase social welfare by redistributing personal property rights from 
members of the general public to particular beneficiaries:  “Welfare aims to 
improve social well-being by helping the poor, whereas copyright aims to 
improve social well-being by helping those who create expressive works.”23  
Welfare redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the poor, and provides the 
benefit of reducing poverty, at the cost of discouraging work.24  Copyright 
                                                
14. LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 67 (2005). 
15. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 
765 (2006) (book review). 
16. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 745. 
17. See id. at 776–77. 
18. See Posner, supra note 15, at 765. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
21. See infra Part V.A–B. 
22. See infra Part V.C. 
23. Tom W. Bell, Author’s Welfare:  Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for 
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 236 (2003). 
24. See id. at 231 n.1. 
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redistributes rights from the public to authors, and provides the benefit of 
increasing the supply of expressive works, at the cost of limiting their use.25 
More controversially, Bell argues that the success of welfare reform 
suggests the potential for successful copyright reform.26  Welfare reform 
reduced the subsidy provided to the poor by limiting the availability of 
welfare, and Bell claims that it was successful because it encouraged work 
without increasing poverty.27  Based on the success of welfare reform, Bell 
argues that copyright reform limiting the scope of copyright would increase 
the use of expressive works, without reducing their supply.28 
Of course, there are weaknesses in Bell’s argument.29  To begin with, 
many people disagree with his assertion that welfare reform was successful, 
or that it encouraged work without increasing poverty.30  If welfare reform 
was not successful, perhaps copyright reform would also not be successful. 
More fundamentally, Bell’s comparison of welfare and copyright is 
strained, because they are not as similar as he suggests.31  Bell himself 
admits that the analogy is not perfect, because copyright “looks a lot more 
like property than welfare does.”32  Specifically, copyright provides rights to 
exclude, but welfare only provides a right to due process.33  He argues that 
his analogy still holds, because welfare and copyright are both statutory 
entitlements, not property rights.34 
But Bell ignores other differences between welfare and copyright 
which are fatal to his analogy. First, welfare provides a direct subsidy to the 
poor, but copyright provides an indirect subsidy to authors. As a result, the 
burden of welfare falls on the government, but the burden of copyright falls 
on consumers of works of authorship. Second, welfare is vulnerable to 
                                                
25. Id. at 245. 
26. Id. at 277. 
27. Id. at 236; Peter Edelman, Professor of Law, Poverty & Welfare:  Does 
Compassionate Conservatism Have a Heart?, Edward C. Sobota Memorial Lecture Series 
(2001), in 64 ALB. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2001).  Specifically, Bell refers to The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.  Bell, supra note 23, at 231 n.1. 
28. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236; Tom. W. Bell, Escape from Copyright:  
Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 741, 744, 746 (2001). 
29. See Edelman, supra note 27, at 1074–76, 1078–79. 
30. See, e.g., id. at 1074–76, 1078–79. 
31. See id. at 255. 
32. Id. 
33. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing exclusive rights in 
copyrighted works), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1970) (holding that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing before the 
termination of welfare benefits). 
34. Bell, supra note 23, at 273–74. 
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government failures caused by majoritarian politics, but copyright is 
vulnerable to government failures caused by rent-seeking. Third, welfare is 
intended to increase static efficiency by improving the allocation of wealth, 
but copyright is intended to increase dynamic efficiency by encouraging the 
creation of works of authorship. And fourth, welfare is a common-pool 
resource because it is rivalrous, but works of authorship are public goods 
because they are non-rivalrous. 
While the differences between welfare and copyright render Bell’s 
conclusions unconvincing, the analogy that he draws between welfare and 
copyright still improved our understanding of copyright by showing that it is 
best understood as a form of statutory entitlement, rather than a form of 
physical property.35  It follows that the scope and duration of copyright 
protection ought to be determined in relation to other statutory entitlements, 
rather than in relation to physical property.36  Moreover, even the limited 
success of Bell’s analogy suggests that alternative analogies may further 
improve our understanding of copyright.37  Specifically, this Article argues 
that comparing copyright and charity law can improve our understanding of 
both areas of law, and show how they complement each other. 
IV. COPYRIGHT & CHARITY LAW 
The prevailing theories of both copyright and charity law are 
economic subsidy theories, which hold that copyright and charity law are 
justified because they increase social welfare by solving market and 
government failures caused by free riding.38  This formal similarity of the 
respective theories of copyright and charity law is reinforced by a substantive 
similarity in their purpose.39  The purpose of copyright is to increase public 
welfare by solving market failures in works of authorship, which are a 
particular form of public good, and the purpose of charity law is to increase 
public welfare by solving market failures in charitable goods, which include 
                                                
35. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005).  “If we must fall back on a physical-world analogy for 
intellectual property protection—and I see no reason why we should—treating intellectual 
property as a form of government subsidy is more likely to get people to understand the 
tradeoffs involved than treating it as real property.”  Id. at 1032 n.2 (stating “Tom Bell is the 
first to draw this analogy, likening copyright specifically to a particular form of government 
subsidy:  [W]elfare”). 
36. See id. at 1069–71. 
37. See id. at 1032. 
38. Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 159–60 
(2014). 
39. See id. at 168. 
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a broad range of public and quasi-public goods, including works of 
authorship.40  In other words, works of authorship are a category of 
charitable goods, and copyright is arguably a category of charity law, or 
rather, the continuation of charity by other means.41 
A. The Economic Subsidy Theory of Copyright 
The economic subsidy theory of copyright holds that it is justified 
because it solves market and government failures in works of authorship 
caused by free riding.42  Works of authorship are non-rivalrous—or public 
goods—because the consumption of a work of authorship does not affect the 
supply.43  Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market 
failures in public goods, because rational economic actors will consume the 
good without paying the marginal cost of production.44 
Copyright solves market failures in works of authorship by making 
them excludable and thereby enabling authors to recover their fixed costs and 
opportunity costs.45  In other words, copyright indirectly subsidizes authors 
by giving them certain exclusive rights to use works of authorship for a 
certain period of time.46  As a result, authors can internalize some of the 
positive externalities or spillovers generated by the creation of a work of 
authorship by charging consumers more than the marginal cost of 
production.47  Essentially, copyright provides an incentive for marginal 
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship.48 
Of course, direct subsidies can also solve market failures in works of 
authorship caused by free riding.49  For example, governments directly 
subsidize the production of works of authorship by distributing grants to 
authors.50  But these direct subsidies are vulnerable to government failures 
caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs, especially information costs.51  
                                                
40. See id. at 166. 
41. Cf. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret 
eds., trans., 1976) (“War Is Merely the Continuation of [Politics] by Other Means”). 
42. Frye, supra note 38, at 159–160; see also RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. 
HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 141 (2013). 
43. See Frye, supra note 38, at 163; Lemley, supra note 35, at 1054. 
44. Frye, supra note 38, at 164. 
45. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1054. 
46. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2012). 
47. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
257, 268 (2007). 
48. Id. at 283–84. 
49. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164. 
50. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063. 
51. See id. 
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/4
2015] COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY 349 
Public choice theory predicts that rent-seeking will cause governments to 
distribute grants inefficiently, and classical economics predicts that 
information costs and other transaction costs will prevent governments from 
distributing grants efficiently.52  In others words, governments cannot know 
which authors to subsidize, and politics creates incentives to subsidize the 
wrong authors.53 
Copyright solves government failures in works of authorship by 
reducing certain forms of rent-seeking and transaction costs.54  Copyright 
reduces ex ante rent-seeking by subsidizing all authors in relation to the 
economic value of their work of authorship.55  Copyright also reduces ex 
ante transaction costs by enabling marginal authors to decide whether the 
private cost of investing in authorship is smaller than the private benefit 
provided by copyright.56  Presumably, individual authors can gather and 
assess relevant information more efficiently than governments.57 
B. The Economic Subsidy Theory of Charity 
The economic subsidy theory of charity law holds that it “is justified 
because it solves market . . . and government failures in charitable goods” 
caused by free riding.58  Charitable goods resemble public goods because 
they are either actually or ideally non-rivalrous.59  For example, religion is 
actually non-rivalrous because the consumption of religion does not affect 
the supply; food banks are ideally non-rivalrous because they are intended to 
provide food to all who require it.60  Accordingly, “[c]lassical economics 
predicts that free riding will cause market failures in [charitable] goods.”61 
Charity law solves market failures in charitable goods by enabling 
certain donors to deduct certain charitable contributions from their income 
tax base, thereby compensating for free riding on charitable contributions by 
indirectly subsidizing altruism.62  In other words, charity law indirectly 
subsidizes the production of charitable goods by reducing the cost of 
                                                
52. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65; Lemley, supra note 35, at 1065. 
53. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65. 
54. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063–64. 
55. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 47, at 268. 
56. See id.; Frye, supra note 38, at 164. 
57. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164. 
58. Id. at 158–59; see also JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE 
CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 109, 113 (1995). 
59. Frye, supra note 38, at 163, 165. 
60. See id. at 163–65. 
61. Id. at 163. 
62. Id. at 166–67. 
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altruism.63  Essentially, charity law provides an incentive for marginal donors 
to invest in the production of charitable goods, thereby generating positive 
externalities.64 
Of course, direct subsidies can also solve market failures in 
charitable goods caused by free riding.65  Governments can and do directly 
subsidize the production of charitable goods by distributing grants to 
charities.66  But these direct subsidies are vulnerable to market failures 
caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs.67  Public choice theory predicts 
that rent-seeking will cause governments to distribute grants inefficiently, 
and classical economics predicts that information costs and other transaction 
costs will prevent governments from distributing grants efficiently.68  In 
others words, governments cannot know which charities to subsidize, and 
politics creates incentives to subsidize the wrong charities.69 
Charity law solves government failures in charitable goods by 
reducing certain forms of rent-seeking and transaction costs.70  Charity law 
reduces rent-seeking and transaction costs by subsidizing altruism, 
depending on donors to identify worthy charities.71  Presumably, individual 
donors can gather and assess relevant information more efficiently than 
governments. 
C. Comparing Copyright & Charity Law 
The structural similarity of the economic subsidy theories of 
copyright and charity law is obvious.72  Both hold that indirect subsidies are 
justified because they solve market and government failures in a public good 
and thereby increase social welfare.73  Copyright is justified because it 
increases social welfare by providing an incentive to create works of 
authorship, and charity law is justified because it increases social welfare by 
providing an incentive to make charitable contributions.74 
                                                
63. See id. 
64. See Frye, supra note 38, at 168, 171. 
65. Id. at 167. 
66. Id. at 177. 
67. Id. at 177–78. 
68. See id. at 164–65, 177–78. 
69. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164–65, 177–78. 
70. Id. at 166–67. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 166. 
73. Id. 
74. Frye, supra note 38, at 162. 
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The economic subsidy theories of copyright and charity law are 
welfarist theories, which hold that copyright and charity law are justified 
because they are efficient.75  In other words, copyright and charity law are 
justified because their social benefit is larger than their social cost, so they 
actually increase social welfare.76  It follows that the justification of both 
copyright and charity law depends on a testable hypothesis.77  According to 
the economic subsidy theory, copyright is justified because the social benefit 
of increasing the production of works of authorship is actually larger than the 
social cost of increasing the scope or duration of copyright protection, and 
charity law is justified because the social benefit of increasing the production 
of charitable goods is larger than the social cost of reduced tax revenue.78  Or 
rather, copyright and charity law are justified because they increase social 
welfare on the margins.79  But that hypothesis is inconsistent with the 
doctrine and development of both copyright and charity law.80 
D. The Justification for Copyright 
Copyright doctrine is inconsistent with its welfarist justification 
because the scope and duration of copyright protection is uniform for all 
works of authorship, even though the efficient scope and duration of 
copyright protection necessarily depend on the circumstances.81  Each work 
of authorship necessarily has unique fixed costs of production, and each 
author necessarily has unique opportunity costs.82  Moreover, some authors 
may choose to invest in the production of works of authorship even if they 
cannot recover their fixed and opportunity costs.83  In theory, the scope and 
duration of copyright protection should vary from author to author and from 
work to work. 
Of course, it is practically impossible to tailor the scope and duration 
of copyright protection to particular authors and works.  But the scope and 
duration of copyright protection does not even vary among categories of 
works with manifestly different fixed and opportunity costs.84  As Brad 
Greenberg has memorably observed, Copyright protection under the 1976 
                                                
75. Id. at 168. 
76. Id. at 162. 
77. Id. at 158, 172. 
78. Id. at 162. 
79. Frye, supra note 38, at 166–67. 
80. Id. at 168. 
81. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2012); Bell, supra note 23, at 277. 
82. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1032. 
83. See id. at 1050. 
84. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302. 
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Act is like an Oprah giveaway:  Everybody gets one.85  An email, a novel, a 
home video, and a feature film all receive copyright protection of the same 
scope and duration.86 
In addition, the actual scope and duration of copyright protection 
were not determined in relation to its ostensible welfarist justification.87  
Congress did not seriously consider marginal efficiency when it determined 
the scope and duration of copyright protection.88  And courts explicitly 
refrain from considering the marginal efficiency of copyright protection 
when reviewing its legitimacy.89 
Moreover, the economic subsidy theory assumes that copyright is 
justified because authors are rational economic actors, and marginal authors 
will decide whether to invest in creating works of authorship based on 
whether they can expect to recover their costs.90  But in practice, many 
authors are not exclusively rational economic actors, and choose to invest in 
the production of works of authorship even if they do not expect to recover 
their costs.91  In fact, because copyright automatically protects even the most 
trivial works of expression, copyright protection is not a salient incentive to 
the overwhelming majority of authors who receive copyright protection.92  
For example, copyright protects emails and snapshots, but does not provide a 
salient incentive to produce those works of authorship.93  The economic 
theory holds that copyright is justified because it increases social welfare; so 
to the extent that copyright protection is not a salient incentive, it is not 
justified.94 
                                                
85. Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright and Trademark Troll:  Fable or Fact?, held 
by Chapman University School of Law, Law Review Symposium (Jan. 30, 2015) (Audio 
Recording 19:34–19:53), available at 
http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Play/5fee649a60414522a5a1c1627f222ff81d. 
86. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302. 
87. See id. §§ 106, 302; Bell, supra note 23, at 277. 
88. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302; Bell, supra note 23, at 277. 
89. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“In sum, we find 
that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional 
determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they 
may be.”). 
90. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 24–25 (2008). 
91. See id. 
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; Bell, supra note 23, at 242. 
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
94. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/4
2015] COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY 353 
E. The Justification for Charity Law 
Charity law doctrine is also inconsistent with its welfarist 
justification because the indirect subsidy provided by the charitable 
contribution deduction is unrelated to the market and government failures 
that it ostensibly solves.95  The charitable contribution deduction indirectly 
subsidizes the production of charitable goods by allowing certain donors to 
deduct certain charitable contributions from their income tax base.96  As a 
consequence, the higher the marginal income tax rate on the donor, the larger 
the subsidy, and the lower the marginal income tax rate on the donor, the 
smaller the subsidy.97  But there is no relationship between a donor’s 
marginal income tax rate and the market and government failures associated 
with the recipient of that donor’s charitable contribution.98  If anything, they 
may be negatively correlated.99 
In addition, the charitable contribution deduction is a salient 
incentive to only a small minority of donors.  Taxpayers can claim charitable 
contribution deductions only if they itemize their deductions, but only about 
thirty percent of taxpayers itemize their deductions.100  As a result, the 
charitable contribution deduction is not a salient incentive for the seventy 
percent of taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions, and is a 
considerably less salient incentive for low-income taxpayers than it is for 
high-income taxpayers.101 
Moreover, the economic subsidy theory assumes that charity law is 
justified because donors are rational economic actors, and marginal donors 
will decide whether to make charitable contributions based on whether they 
will receive a deduction.102  But in practice, many donors are not exclusively 
rational economic actors, and choose to make charitable contributions even 
though they do not expect to receive a deduction.103  The economic subsidy 
                                                
95. Frye, supra note 38, at 159–60. 
96. Id. at 159. 
97. Id. at 169. 
 98. See id. at 168. 
 99. See id. 
100. BENJAMIN H. HARRIS & DANIEL BANEMAN, TAX POLICY CTR., WHO 
ITEMIZES DEDUCTIONS? 345 (2011), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
UploadedPDF/1001486-Who-Itemizes-Deductions.pdf. 
101. But see Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable 
Deduction:  An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1310, 1325–26, 1327 
n.93 (2012) (arguing that the charitable contribution deduction may be “hypersalient” to 
certain taxpayers who mistakenly believe they can claim a deduction). 
 102. DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT ECONOMY 15 (1988); Frye, supra note 38, at 158. 
 103. See Frye, supra note 38, at 166, 182. 
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theory holds that charity law is justified because it increases social welfare, 
so to the extent that the charitable contribution deduction is not a salient 
incentive to a particular donor, it is not justified.104 
V. COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY 
While the premises of the economic subsidy theories of copyright 
and charity law are inconsistent with copyright and charity law doctrine, 
their structural similarities illuminate their complementary relationship.105  
The purpose of copyright is to increase public welfare by providing an 
incentive for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of 
authorship, and the purpose of charity law is to increase public welfare by 
providing an incentive for marginal donors to invest in the production of 
charitable goods.106 
Essentially, works of authorship are a category of charitable 
goods.107  Works of authorship and charitable goods both increase public 
welfare by providing a public good.108  In fact, charity law provides that 
subsidizing the production and distribution of works of authorship is a 
charitable purpose.109 
It follows that copyright and charity law ought to be evaluated in 
relation to one another. Under the economic subsidy theories of copyright 
and charity law, indirect subsidies are justified to the extent that they are 
efficient. If copyright is intended to increase public welfare by providing an 
incentive for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of 
authorship, copyright is justified only to the extent that it is more efficient 
than charity law at providing incentives for marginal authors to invest in 
charitable goods. 
A. Copyright & Efficiency 
Copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs that cause 
market failures in works of authorship by devolving the decision—whether 
to invest in the production of works of authorship—onto marginal authors, 
who are generally in the best position to determine whether investing in a 
                                                
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. at 159. 
 106. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id.; Frye, supra note 38, at 168. 
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work of authorship is likely to increase social welfare.110  Moreover, 
copyright forces authors to assume the risk of their investment by providing 
a subsidy only if an author actually produces a work of authorship with 
social value. Accordingly, copyright is generally highly efficient to the 
extent that it enables authors to recover the fixed and opportunity costs of 
investing in the production of works of authorship.111  While many authors 
would choose to invest in the production of works of authorship whether or 
not they received a subsidy, copyright presumably provides at least a 
marginal incentive to authors who contemplate investing more than a 
nominal amount of resources in producing a work of authorship.112 
However, copyright is inefficient to the extent that it provides a 
subsidy in excess of the fixed and opportunity costs of investing in the 
production of works of authorship, not only because those subsidies do not 
provide a marginal incentive, but also because they increase transaction 
costs.113  To the extent that authors are rational economic actors, a subsidy 
that exceeds the fixed and opportunity costs of investing in works of 
authorship is inefficient; it provides an incentive to overinvest in the 
production of works of authorship. The purpose of copyright is to encourage 
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship that will increase 
social welfare.114  Increasing the subsidy to works of authorship provides an 
incentive to invest in the production of works of authorship even if they will 
not increase social welfare. 
In addition, copyright increases ex post transaction costs by 
increasing the cost of consuming a work of authorship and increasing 
information costs relating to the use of that work of authorship.115  
Transaction costs imposed by copyright protection are justified to the extent 
that they are offset by increases in public welfare. But copyright protection in 
excess of what is required to provide an efficient incentive to marginal 
authors is not justified because it creates transaction costs that are not offset 
by increases in public welfare.116  In other words, copyright protection that 
does not provide an efficient incentive to marginal authors provides a private 
                                                
 110. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 23–25; Bell, supra note 23, at 267, 
267 n.212 
 111. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 24–25; Bell, supra note 23, at 
267 n.212, 267–68. 
 112. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236, 267 n.212, 267–68. 
113. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1032. 
114. Bell, supra note 23, at 236, 238. 
115. See id. at 277–78, 278 n.261. 
116. See id. 
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benefit without generating a corresponding public benefit, and reduces public 
welfare.117 
To make matters worse, public choice theory predicts that copyright 
is vulnerable to rent-seeking because authors have a strong incentive to lobby 
the government to increase the scope and duration of copyright protection, 
irrespective of its efficiency.118  In particular, owners of valuable copyrights 
have an incentive to invest in lobbying the government to increase the value 
of those copyrights.119 
B. Charity Law & Efficiency 
Charity law efficiently reduces transaction costs that cause market 
failures in charitable goods by devolving the decision—whether to invest in 
the production of charitable goods—onto marginal donors, who are often in 
good position to determine whether investing in the production of a 
charitable good is likely to increase social welfare.120  Specifically, donors 
are reasonably well-positioned to determine whether investing in the 
production of a work of authorship is likely to increase public welfare.121  If 
altruism motivates a donor to make a charitable contribution to the 
production of a work of authorship, it is likely that the production of that 
work of authorship will increase social welfare, and is thereby likely that any 
indirect subsidy provided by the government will be efficient.122  In addition, 
if altruism motivates a donor to make a charitable contribution to the 
distribution of a work of authorship or the support of an author, it is likely 
that the contribution will increase social welfare by enabling that author to 
produce additional works of authorship, and is thereby likely that any 
indirect subsidy provided by the government will also be efficient.123 
C. Comparing the Efficiency of Copyright & Charity Law 
While copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs relating 
to investments in the production of charitable goods, it increases ex post 
                                                
117. See id. 
118. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 261, 264–65; Lemley, supra 
note 35, at 1063. 
119. Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063–64. 
120. See Frye, supra note 38, at 162, 167–68, 171. 
121. Id. at 174. 
122. See id. at 166, 171. 
123. See id. 
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transaction costs.124  By contrast, charity law reduces both ex ante and ex 
post costs.125  Copyright reduces ex ante transaction costs more efficiently 
than charity law, because authors are generally in a better position than 
donors to determine whether investing in a work of authorship will increase 
social welfare.126  But copyright increases ex post transaction costs by 
granting windfalls to authors and creating opportunities for rent-seeking, 
while charity law is associated with low ex post transaction costs, because it 
depends on altruism.127 
It follows that copyright should focus on providing ex ante 
incentives to marginal authors, and rely on charity law or its analogues to 
provide any additional subsidies to authors.  Charity law is especially well-
suited to this goal, because it relies on altruism, rather than self-interest.128  
Copyright assumes that authors invest in the production of works of 
authorship in order to benefit themselves.129  By contrast, charity law 
assumes that donors invest in the production of works of authorship in order 
to benefit the public.130  Charity law is likely to increase public welfare 
because it subsidizes donations intended to increase public welfare.131 
But there are additional reasons to consider reducing the scope and 
duration of copyright and to consider relying on charity rather than copyright 
to increase investment in works of authorship.  Historically, transaction costs 
made it difficult for donors to determine which marginal authors to 
subsidize.132  Donors did not know which authors to subsidize, and did not 
have a convenient way to make contributions.133  Moreover, charity law 
created incentives for them to donate to charities rather than individual 
authors.134 
Accordingly, donors contributed to charitable organizations, which 
solved transaction costs by developing expertise in identifying which artists 
                                                
124. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–
68. 
125. See Frye, supra note 38, at 166–68. 
126. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–
68, 182. 
127. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277–78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166–
68, 182. 
128. Frye, supra note 38, at 168. 
129. See Bell, supra note 23, at 238, 242. 
130. See Frye, supra note 38, at 161. 
131. See id. at 160–62. 
132. Id. at 157, 182. 
133. See id. at 157. 
134. Id. at 187–88. 
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to subsidize and provided charitable contribution deductions.135  But authors 
and donors also developed legal workarounds, which enabled them to steer 
charitable contributions to particular authors.136  And more recently, social 
entrepreneurs have developed methods of using technology to solve charity 
failures, and more efficiently encourage and enable marginal donors to make 
donations in support of the production of works of authorship.137 
1. Fiscal Sponsorship 
For example, in the arts sector, donors and authors use fiscal 
sponsorship in order to enable donors to both support particular authors or 
particular projects and claim a charitable contribution deduction.138  In 
theory, charity law only permits taxpayers to claim charitable contribution 
deductions for donations to charitable organizations that are exempt under 26 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).139  As a consequence, it does not allow taxpayers to claim 
charitable contribution deductions for donations to individuals, which are 
generally treated as gifts for income tax purposes.140 
Donors and authors use fiscal sponsors in order to circumvent that 
restriction.141  A fiscal sponsor is a charitable organization that receives 
charitable contributions from donors on behalf of particular authors.142  The 
donor claims a charitable contribution deduction, the charity claims a fee, 
and the author receives the balance of the donation.143  Essentially, fiscal 
sponsorship is a legal fiction that enables donors to claim a deduction for a 
contribution to an individual.144  In theory, the charity receiving the 
contribution is not obligated to pass the donation on to its intended private 
recipient, and makes an independent determination that providing funds to 
that author is consistent with its charitable purpose.145  But this obligation is 
observed almost entirely in the breach, and charities acting as fiscal sponsors 
                                                
135. See Frye, supra note 38, at 183. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 159, 190–92. 
138. Id. at 187–88. 
139. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., FISCAL SPONSORSHIP:  
AN ALTERNATIVE TO FORMING A NONPROFIT 501(C)(3) CORPORATION 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/0483.pdf. 
140. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
141. PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
142. See PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2.; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship 
Service, IOBY, https://www.ioby.org/fiscal-sponsorship (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
143. Frye, supra note 38, at 187. 
144. See id. 
145. See PUB. COUNS. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship 
Service, supra note 142. 
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/4
2015] COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY 359 
effectively function as conduits for donations that would otherwise be 
ineligible for charitable contribution deductions.146 
Interestingly, the IRS has tolerated the practice of fiscal sponsorship, 
despite its apparent inconsistency with federal tax law.147  The best 
explanation for the IRS’s forbearance is probably that while fiscal 
sponsorship may strain the letter of the law, it is generally consistent with its 
purpose.148  Charities generally exercise at least some oversight over the 
authors and projects they agree to sponsor, and sponsoring works of 
authorship is generally a charitable activity. 
In addition, fiscal sponsorship may help solve market failures 
associated with works of authorship by reducing transaction costs associated 
with determining which works to sponsor.149  It is costly for charities to 
determine which authors and projects to sponsor, and it is difficult for 
charities to solicit funds to sponsor works of authorship in general, rather 
than specific projects.150  Fiscal sponsorship reduces these transaction costs 
by enabling donors and authors to make a direct connection, without a 
mediating charity.151 
In any case, the prevalence of fiscal sponsorship suggests that charity 
law provides a salient incentive to at least some marginal donors. In the 
absence of fiscal sponsorship, donors could still make gifts to individual 
authors.152  The primary purpose of fiscal sponsorship is to ensure that 
donors can claim a charitable contribution deduction for their donation.153  
Presumably, the ability to claim a charitable contribution deduction 
motivates at least some marginal donors to give. 
However, fiscal sponsorship has a critical weakness, which is a 
function of its reliance on leveraging the charitable contribution deduction in 
the service of reducing transaction costs.154  Because fiscal sponsorship 
depends on the salience of the charitable contribution deduction, it cannot 
provide a salient incentive to marginal donors who cannot claim the 
                                                
146. See Frye, supra note 38, at 187; Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra 
note 142. 
147. See Ioby’s Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142. 
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deduction.155  As a result, the overwhelming majority of taxpayers should be 
indifferent to fiscal sponsorship. 
2. Crowdfunding 
As I have previously shown, charity law is vulnerable to charity 
failures, or inefficiencies in its ability to solve market and government 
failures, caused by the inability of the charitable contribution deduction to 
provide a salient incentive to the overwhelming majority of taxpayers who 
do not itemize their deductions.156  I argue that the remarkable success of 
crowdfunding—which already provides more arts funding than the federal 
government—is a function of its ability to solve some of those charity 
failures.  First, crowdfunding reduces transaction costs associated with 
soliciting donations, by providing authors with low-cost platforms that make 
it easy to leverage the network effects of social media.157  Second, 
crowdfunding reduces transactions associated with making donations, by 
reducing search and information costs on donors.158  And third, reward-based 
crowdfunding enables authors to provide salient incentives to marginal 
donors who cannot claim charitable contribution deductions.159 
Essentially, crowdfunding is a way of using technology to solve 
charity failures.160  Of course, crowdfunding works of authorship is generally 
not charitable in the strictest sense, as most donations are not charitable 
contributions under the Internal Revenue Code.161  However, it is often 
charitable in the broader sense that the contributions include a gratuitous 
element and are intended to support the creation of works of authorship that 
will increase public welfare.162 
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3. Open-Source 
The open-source movement is another way of using technology to 
solve charity failures.163  Open-source is a development model that provides 
universal access to works of authorship by providing a free license to use and 
distribute the work, and by requiring that authors of derivative works also 
provide a free license to use and distribute the derivative work.164  The open-
source movement initially focused on computer software, enabling authors to 
provide a free license for the public to use, distribute, and improve source 
code.165  But the open-source movement has subsequently expanded to other 
forms of authorship and innovation, and has inspired many related open 
licensing schemes, like Creative Commons.166  Open-source is especially 
prevalent in various scholarly fields, and there is an emerging norm among 
scholars in many fields to provide open access to all of their papers and 
research.167 
Essentially, open-source is a way of using the Internet and social 
media to reduce transaction costs associated with copyright and other forms 
of intellectual property.168  Historically, works of authorship were distributed 
by commercial intermediaries, which reduced transaction costs by enabling 
authors to effectively distribute works of authorship to the public.169  The 
Internet and social media have rendered many of those commercial 
distributors largely irrelevant by enabling authors to effectively distribute 
certain categories of works of authorship to the public at no cost.170  Many 
authors do not need to recover the fixed and opportunity costs of 
authorship.171  For example, most scholars produce works of authorship as a 
function of their employment.172  As a consequence, open-source is attractive 
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to scholars, as it enables them to distribute their works of authorship at no 
cost to the consumer, thereby increasing its distribution in the academic gift 
economy.173 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Copyright and charity law are similar because they both use indirect 
subsidies to solve market and government failures in public goods caused by 
free riding. Copyright solves market and government failures in works of 
authorship, a particular category of public goods. Charity law solves market 
and government failures in charitable goods, which include a broad range of 
public and quasi-public goods, including works of authorship. Copyright 
solves market failures in works of authorship by making them partially 
excludable and thereby limiting free riding, and solves government failures 
by reducing information costs associated with determining which works to 
subsidize. Charity law solves market failures in charitable goods by making 
certain charitable contributions deductible, and thereby compensating for 
free riding, and solves government failures by reducing transaction costs 
associated with majoritarian politics. In other words, copyright and charity 
law are complements that use different means to pursue similar goals. 
Notably, copyright and charity law are associated with different 
transaction costs. Copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs by 
delegating the decision whether to invest in works of authorship onto 
marginal authors and by forcing them to internalize the risk associated with 
investing in works of authorship. But copyright increases ex post transaction 
costs by making it more difficult and expensive for consumers to use works 
of authorship. Moreover, copyright encourages rent-seeking by the copyright 
owners of works with substantial social value. 
By contrast, charity law moderately reduces both ex ante and ex post 
transaction costs by delegating the decision whether to invest in charitable 
goods onto marginal donors, and by providing a relatively modest and 
contingent subsidy. While copyright reduces ex ante transaction costs 
associated with investment charity law more efficiently than charity law, 
copyright increases ex post transaction costs, and charity law does not. In 
addition, new technologies like crowdfunding and the open-source 
movement enable authors and donors to solve certain market and 
government failures previously addressed by copyright and charity law 
without the need for the indirect subsidies that copyright and charity law use 
to provide incentive to marginal authors and donors. 
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As a consequence, we should consider reducing the scope of 
copyright protection to focus on its ability to efficiently reduce ex ante 
transaction costs by enabling authors to recover their fixed and opportunities 
costs, and use charity law and related technologies to reduce ex post 
transaction costs associated with investment in the creation of works of 
authorship. 
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